UPES-ECS Security Hardening & Abuse Handling¶
Closes Risk R9 (SIP abuse / DoS) and R14 (prank / false alarms). LAN-only, but "internal network" is not "trusted network" — campus Wi-Fi is shared.
1. Registration & anti-abuse¶
| Control | Setting |
|---|---|
| Anonymous SIP | Disabled (allowguest=no, no anonymous endpoint) |
| Guest / unknown devices | Blocked from registering |
| Unique credentials | One per account/device |
| Password strength | ≥ 12 chars, random; banned trivial passwords |
| fail2ban | Enable the Asterisk jail — ban IPs after repeated failed registrations/auth |
| Registration rate-limit | Throttle repeated REGISTER from one IP/account |
| Registration source | LAN/campus Wi-Fi subnets only; guest Wi-Fi excluded |
| Failed-reg logging | On → feeds Health Monitoring as an Access/registration event |
2. Network / firewall¶
- SIP (5060) + RTP range bound to the LAN interface only — never the public internet.
- Firewall allows SIP/RTP only from approved subnets (student Wi-Fi, staff Wi-Fi, ERT/fixed LAN); deny the rest.
- FreePBX admin GUI restricted to the management subnet — never reachable from student Wi-Fi.
- Wi-Fi client isolation: off (or bypassed) only for the paths that need PBX access; keep everything else isolated.
- Consider a dedicated voice VLAN for ERT/fixed devices.
3. Asterisk hardening¶
- Disable unused modules (
modules.confnoloadfor drivers/apps you don't use — e.g. other channel drivers, unused apps). - Run Asterisk as the
asteriskuser, not root. - Restrict AMI/ARI to localhost / the management subnet with strong credentials (needed later for dashboards/AI).
- Keep FreePBX + Asterisk patched (Module Admin updates on a schedule).
- Log to a protected location; don't world-read logs containing caller data.
4. Media confidentiality (planned — R7)¶
Plain UDP RTP is sniffable on shared Wi-Fi. Future security enhancement: - TLS for SIP signaling + SRTP for media, at least on ERT/fixed devices (Linphone/MicroSIP support it). - Certificate management on the PBX. - Marked deferred in the Risk Register; revisit before wide student rollout.
5. Protecting the 111 queue from flooding¶
The emergency line must not be drownable by junk:
- Per-account concurrent-call limits for normal users (students/staff) so no one account can open many channels.
- Emergency calls (111) run in a separate context/priority so bulk traffic can't starve them.
- Monitor channel capacity; alert if normal traffic approaches emergency headroom.
- Capacity-test toward a realistic surge, not just 2–5 calls (ties to the surge posture).
6. Prank / false-alarm handling (R14)¶
111 must always stay reachable — never rate-limit real emergencies away. Handle abuse after the fact, by identity:
1. Every call carries caller ID (Name - SAP ID) → the caller is known.
2. Repeated false/prank calls from a SAP ID are flagged ("cry wolf" tracking).
3. ERT Lead reviews; issue a warning per university policy.
4. Persistent abuse → suspend the SIP account (not the person's ability to be helped —
fixed phones + escalation still cover genuine need), escalate to university discipline.
5. Log all of it; keep evidence (recording + incident log).
Never disable someone's ability to reach help as a first response — investigate, warn, then suspend the account for repeat abuse.
7. Account compromise / lost device¶
- Immediately reset the SIP secret and drop active registrations.
- Force re-provision; block the old credential; log the event.
- Preserve the account's history/logs (identity is never reused).
(Full lifecycle in Device Provisioning.)
8. What gets logged (security)¶
Successful + failed registration · unknown-device attempts · Access Denied Events · paging attempts (allowed + denied) · conference joins · transfer/dispatch · voicemail & recording access · config changes · account disable/revoke · fail2ban bans.
Review these in the Health Dashboard and the weekly drill report.
9. Live status/control API (upes-api :8090) — attack surface¶
The Console is backed by a FastAPI service (systemd unit upes-api, Restart=always)
that runs inside the VM on port 8090 and queries Asterisk locally. It serves GET /health,
GET /status, and a privileged POST /exec. Because /exec can drive the PBX, it is a real
attack surface and is locked down accordingly:
- Whitelist-only actions:
/execaccepts onlyshift/callout/drill/reload. Nothing else can run; there is no free-form command path. - Bind local / tunnel-only: :8090 is not published to the LAN. The Console reaches it
through a persistent SSH tunnel (
localhost:18090 → VM:8090), so exposure rides on SSH (keys + fail2ban sshd jail), not an open HTTP port. - Restricted CORS: cross-origin is denied, so a random browser page a user opens cannot
cross-origin
POSTto/exec. The Console UI also requires a confirm-before-run click. - Treat the API host as management-plane: keep it off student/guest Wi-Fi and audit
/execcalls alongside config changes (§8).
10. Availability & recovery hardening (done)¶
Availability is a security property for an emergency line. The following are in place:
systemd Restart=alwayson both asterisk andupes-api— auto-recovery if the process crashes, on top of boot autostart.- Boot autostart of the VM and the Console (Windows Startup-folder launchers, no admin required) so the whole stack comes back after a host reboot.
- Nightly backups —
upes-ecs-backup.sh+ cron →/var/backups/upes-ecs/(per SOP 11); restore has been test-verified. - Real all-campus paging PIN provisioned (no placeholder/default).
- SSH hardened for speed + surface:
UseDNS/GSSAPI off,motd-newsdisabled.
11. Secrets handling¶
secrets/TEAM-CREDENTIALS.md holds real SIP logins and must never be web-served. The
Console's static server and its in-app Markdown doc viewer both explicitly block the secrets/
path, and the file stays out of any publicly reachable location. SIP secrets, conference PINs,
and the paging PIN live in restricted include files, not in world-readable config or git.
12. Hardening checklist (before go-live)¶
- [ ] Anonymous SIP off · guest Wi-Fi blocked
- [x] fail2ban Asterisk and sshd jails active
- [ ] Unique ≥12-char secrets; no trivial passwords
- [ ] SIP/RTP firewalled to approved subnets; not public
- [ ] FreePBX GUI on management subnet only
- [ ] Unused Asterisk modules disabled
- [ ] AMI/ARI locked down
- [x]
upes-api:8090 whitelist-only, tunnel-only bind, CORS restricted - [x]
secrets/TEAM-CREDENTIALS.mdblocked from web/doc-viewer serving - [x] asterisk +
upes-apiRestart=always; VM/Console boot autostart; nightly backups - [x] Real all-campus paging PIN set (no default)
- [ ] FreePBX/Asterisk patched
- [ ] Per-account call limits set; 111 priority protected
- [ ] Prank/abuse SOP known to ERT Lead
- [ ] TLS/SRTP planned (deferred item tracked)