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UPES-ECS Risk Register & Known Gaps

An honest list of what can make UPES-ECS fail, weaken it, or block go-live β€” with severity, impact, and a recommended fix. Some items require a university decision (marked βš‘), not just engineering. Review this at every phase gate.

Severity: πŸ”΄ Critical (can defeat the system's purpose) Β· 🟠 High Β· 🟑 Medium Β· βšͺ Low


Decisions applied β€” 2026-07-04

Risk Decision Result
R1 Power System deploys via a self-powered disaster-response van + corner repeaters (doc 23) βœ… Resolved for field mode (van power autonomy). UPS still recommended for fixed campus mode.
R2 Mobile inbound Battery best-practices documented (doc 24); fixed phones for critical answer points βœ… Mitigated. Future app solves fully.
R3 After-hours "Whoever is available"; staffing handled off-system βœ… Out of scope / accepted by university.
R4 Surge Surge / Declared Incident posture added to ERT SOP Part J βœ… Documented.
R5 Location Out of scope now; future UPES VoIP app broadcasts coordinates to the aggregated workflow πŸ”΅ Deferred with a plan.
R6 Silent calls Keep on 111 + silent-call protocol (ERT SOP Part I); future app panic button βœ… Decided. No separate line.
R7 Cleartext media Future security enhancement β€” not a current concern πŸ”΅ Deferred.
R8 Single PBX Fine for now; van doubles as mobile failover (doc 23 Β§7) βœ… Mitigated + plan noted.

The entries below keep the full detail; the table above is the current status.


A. Mission-level risks

R1 πŸ”΄ βš‘ Power dependency contradicts the mission

  • Gap: Spec assumes power is available; the system's whole value is working when networks fail β€” but disasters often cut power too. No UPS in Phase 1.
  • Impact: PBX / switch / router / APs lose power β†’ 111 is dead exactly during a real disaster.
  • Fix: Promote UPS/battery backup for core infra (server, switch, router, key APs) from "later" to Phase 1. Size for the realistic outage window; monitor UPS as a critical device. Add PoE + UPS for the APs covering ERT/critical zones.
  • Owner: IT + university (budget). Decision needed before go-live.

R2 πŸ”΄ Mobile inbound (ERT callback) unreliable

  • Gap: LAN-only forbids push notifications, so locked iOS/Android phones often drop the SIP registration and won't ring on an ERT callback. The Missed-Call Recovery SOP depends on callback.
  • Impact: ERT calls a missed caller back β†’ phone never rings β†’ critical follow-up lost.
  • Fix: Prefer fixed phones as callback/answer targets; tune PJSIP qualify/keepalive; train users on background/battery settings; document mobile inbound as best-effort, outbound (dial 111) as reliable. Consider a small on-device keepalive.
  • Owner: IT + ERT Lead.

R3 πŸ”΄ βš‘ After-hours / zero-staff coverage undefined

  • Gap: "Same path day and night" + "min 2 responders," but no on-call/night model. Empty queue at night β†’ voicemail with nobody watching.
  • Impact: A 3 AM emergency escalates to an unwatched voicemail.
  • Fix: Define a 24/7 on-call rota; night ERT phone(s) always registered; queue-zero raises an alert that someone is actually on-call to see; document the night dispatch chain.
  • Owner: ERT Lead + university. Decision needed.

R4 πŸ”΄ Mass-casualty surge not modeled

  • Gap: One queue + few operators + ring-all can't absorb dozens of simultaneous 111 calls in a real event.
  • Impact: System saturates; real reports blocked; callers dumped to voicemail en masse.
  • Fix: Define a "Declared Incident" surge posture β€” paging-first to push instructions, pull in extra operators, overflow callers to a triage voicemail with location capture, dedup same-event reports. Capacity-test toward realistic surge, not just 2–5 calls.
  • Owner: ERT Lead + IT.

R5 🟠 Location blindness for mobile callers

  • Gap: SAP ID identifies the person, not their physical location. Panicked/injured/lost callers can't always state it.
  • Impact: ERT can't dispatch to the right place fast.
  • Fix: Put "where are you" first in the answer script (already in SOP β€” reinforce); rely on fixed phones for location-anchored calls; explore AP-association β†’ coarse zone mapping and a caller location field later.
  • Owner: ERT Lead + IT.

R6 🟠 βš‘ Voice-only excludes silent / unable-to-speak emergencies

  • Gap: No path for someone who can't talk (active threat, injury, speech/hearing impairment).
  • Impact: The people in the most dangerous situations can't signal.
  • Fix: Define a silent-call protocol (dial 111, stay silent β†’ still recorded, located by extension, treated as live/critical, ERT trained to respond to silence); plan a future text/panic-button channel and accessibility support.
  • Owner: ERT Lead + university (policy).

R7 🟠 Cleartext SIP/RTP on shared campus Wi-Fi

  • Gap: Plain UDP media is sniffable; inconsistent with "recordings encrypted at rest."
  • Impact: Emergency call audio interceptable on the LAN.
  • Fix: TLS + SRTP at least for ERT/fixed devices; evaluate for all clients (Linphone supports it). Weigh against setup complexity.
  • Owner: IT.

R8 🟠 Single PBX = single point of failure

  • Gap: One server; restore target 1 hour = up to an hour with no emergency line.
  • Impact: Hardware/disk/corruption outage removes 111 entirely.
  • Fix: Keep a pre-imaged spare/warm-standby server ready to swap; later, a second PBX (see Multi-Campus Model B). Test the swap.
  • Owner: IT.

B. Security & compliance

R9 🟠 SIP registration abuse / DoS not hardened

  • Fix: fail2ban + registration rate-limiting; disable unused Asterisk modules; concrete LAN firewall rules; lock FreePBX GUI to the management subnet; protect the 111 queue from flooding (per-account call limits, prank-call rate tracking).
  • Owner: IT.

R10 🟠 βš‘ Data-protection compliance unnamed

  • Gap: SAP-ID-linked audio + identity = sensitive personal data; docs defer to "university policy" without naming a regime.
  • Fix: Map recording/retention/access to India DPDP Act 2023 (and any UGC/university rules): lawful basis, notice, access logging, breach handling, retention limits. Get legal sign-off.
  • Owner: University + IT. Decision needed.

R11 🟑 Retention automation + recording verification

  • Fix: Cron-based 90-day auto-delete with an audit log and preservation flag; periodically verify recordings are audible, not merely present.
  • Owner: IT.

C. Operational & organizational

R12 🟠 Bus factor / ownership

  • Gap: If the one admin who built FreePBX leaves, nobody can run it.
  • Fix: Train a backup admin; keep runbooks current; define a RACI (who owns config, roster, approvals, backups, health).
  • Owner: IT + university.

R13 🟑 No cost / bill of materials

  • Fix: Produce a BOM + budget: IP phones, APs, PoE switch, UPS units, spare server, cabling, headsets. FreePBX is free; hardware is not.
  • Owner: IT + university.

R14 🟑 Prank / false-alarm culture on a campus

  • Fix: Track repeat false callers; SOP for warnings/escalation; keep 111 always reachable but log abuse; account suspension after review (already in Role Matrix β€” add a "cry wolf" tracking note).
  • Owner: ERT Lead + IT.

R15 βšͺ Documentation aids missing

  • Fix: Glossary (done); one-page ERT desk quick-card and student quick-card; a RACI table.
  • Owner: IT (docs).

D. Risk summary table

ID Risk Sev Status Fix owner
R1 Power/UPS dependency πŸ”΄ βœ… Resolved (van) IT + university
R2 Mobile inbound callback πŸ”΄ βœ… Mitigated (doc 24) IT + ERT
R3 After-hours coverage πŸ”΄ βœ… Accepted/out of scope ERT + university
R4 Mass-casualty surge πŸ”΄ βœ… Documented (SOP Part J) ERT + IT
R5 Location blindness 🟠 πŸ”΅ Deferred (future app) ERT + IT
R6 Voice-only / silent calls 🟠 βœ… Decided (stay on 111) ERT + university
R7 Cleartext SIP/RTP 🟠 πŸ”΅ Deferred (future sec) IT
R8 Single PBX SPOF 🟠 βœ… Mitigated (van failover) IT
R9 SIP abuse / DoS 🟠 βœ… Documented (doc 26) IT
R10 DPDP compliance 🟠 ⏸️ Out of scope (deferred by decision) University + IT
R11 Retention automation 🟑 βœ… Scripted (retention-cleanup.sh) IT
R12 Bus factor / RACI 🟠 βœ… Documented (doc 27) IT + university
R13 Cost / BOM 🟑 ⚠️ Open (deferred by request) IT + university
R14 Prank / false alarms 🟑 βœ… Documented (doc 26 Β§6) ERT + IT
R15 Doc aids βšͺ βœ… Done (glossary + quick-cards) IT

  1. Resolve the five βš‘ decisions (R1 power, R3 night coverage, R6 silent-call policy, R10 compliance) with the university β€” these are not engineering choices.
  2. Promote UPS (R1) into Phase 1 infrastructure.
  3. Add TLS/SRTP for ERT/fixed devices (R7) and basic hardening (R9).
  4. Write the surge posture (R4) into the ERT SOP.
  5. Prepare a warm-standby server (R8) and train a backup admin (R12).

None of these block starting the build β€” the Phase 1 MVP is still correct. They block declaring the system production-ready and trustworthy for real emergencies.